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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is brought by Plaintiffs-Appellants against the property owner's 
association at an apartment complex for a condition of the interior of one of the units (a 
water heater) occupied by tenant Adra Kipper. Private First Class McQuen For bush and 
Breanna Halowell were guests of Ms. Kipper in her apartment at the Sagecrest Apartment 
Complex on November 9 and 10, 2012. On the night of November 10, 2012, the water 
heater in Ms. Kipper's apartment emitted carbon monoxide into the apartment. Both Ms. 
Halowell and PFC Forbush were exposed to high levels of carbon monoxide and PFC 
For bush died as a result. 
At its core, this appeal is regarding the control of the interior of an apartment on a 
residential lot at the Sagecrest complex for which the property owner's association (POA) 
had no authority to maintain. A property owners' association generally has the duty to 
the members of the common-interest community to use ordinary care and prudence in 
managing the property and financial affairs of the community that are subject to its 
control. See Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 6.13 (2000) (emphasis 
added). Plaintiffs have conceded this point. (R. p. 802; P's Supp brief Re: POA Motion 
for Summary Judgment) ("Such a course of conduct may be highly unusual for an 
owners' association which typically neither has nor exercises control over how a property 
was managed within the interior walls of an apartment..."). In this case, there are no 
duties under the Conditions, Covenants, & Restrictions ( CC Rs) that are out of the 
ordinary, nor is there a special relationship or assumed duties to the guests of the tenant 
that changed the POA's general duties. 
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Plaintiffs initially sued INTERMOUNTAIN GAS, AO SMITH (the manufacturer 
of the water heater), multiple HV AC companies that either installed or performed 
services on the water heaters at the complex, SAGECREST DEVELOPMENT, LLC (the 
property developer), MATTHEW E. SWITZER, TRUST (the owner of the apartment 
building), FIRST RATE PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC. (the property management 
company), TONY DROST (First Rate president), SAGECREST MULTI FAMILY 
PROPERTY OWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC. (SMPOA), and individual board 
members of the SMPOA, JON KALSBEEK, JAY ARLA, CHRIS SCHWAB, & DAVID 
MEISNER. Noticeably absent from the list of defendants is Adra Kipper, the tenant of 
#4624, who had actual control of the premises. 
Plaintiffs brought claims of negligence, vicarious liability for the negligence of 
FRPM (property manager), and intentional infliction of emotional harm against the 
SMPOA. The Plaintiffs amended their Complaint four times and the allegations against 
these Defendants remained the same. Plaintiffs alleged that SMPOA and Mr. Kalsbeek 
were negligent in the following manner: 
a. Failure to exercise reasonable care under all of the 
circumstances; 
b. Failure to provide and/or maintain the apartment in a 
safe and sanitary condition fit for human habitation; 
c. Failure to provide and/or maintain the apartment's water 
heater, air handler, and heating system in a reasonably 
safe condition; 
d. Failure to perform a reasonable inspection of the 
apartment - including a reasonable inspection of the 
apartment's water heater, air handler and ventilation 
system after determining the water heater was leaking 
carbon monoxide; 
e. Failure to test or confirm the carbon monoxide detectors 
were installed properly and working after delivering 
carbon monoxide detectors to apartment 4624; and, 
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f. Failure to adequately warn of the unreasonably 
dangerous condition in apartment 4624. 
(Id pp. 612-613). 1 Regardless, the alleged duties are all duties owed to a tenant solely by 
the owner of the unit and/or the owner's agent; not a property owner's association that 
manages common areas of a complex. 
SMPOA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was denied by the District 
Court. After several additional Motions for Summary Judgment by co-defendants, 
Presiding Judge Copsey, sua sponte, set a hearing to reconsider SMPOA's summary 
judgment motion. The Court granted the motion for reconsideration, holding that 
SMPOA did not have a duty, nor did it assume a duty, to plaintiffs as guests of a tenant. 
(R., p. 977). The Court further held that SMPOA did not have any authority/duty through 
its own CCRs, or any contractual agreement, to replace or maintain the water heater 
inside the interior of the apartment. (Id.) FRPM's and Switzer's motions for summary 
judgment were denied by the Court, and the lawsuit against them was resolved between 
the parties and dismissed. (Aug., p. 101-106) 
This appeal is brought against SMPOA and one of its board members, Jon 
Kalsbeek. SMPOA had no authority to maintain the interior of the unit in which this 
incident occurred. The Sagecrest Apartment complex, located at 1805 E. Overland Rd., 
Ste. 58, Meridian, in Ada County, Idaho, includes 48 residential lots each containing a 
separate building which has four apartments. The residential lots are owned by 
individuals or entities, and each owner is a shareholder and member of the SMPOA. 
1 Absent are allegations of any premises liability duties or assumed duties by these 
defendants. 
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When this complex was created, the development company, Sagecrest 
Development, LLC, recorded the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions 
(CCRs). (R., p. 64-96). SMPOA is incorporated as a non-profit corporation and its 
Articles of Incorporation describe its purposes and powers to "provide for maintenance, 
preservation and architectural control of those certain lots as established in the 
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of Sagecrest Subdivision ... and 
to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the residents within the subdivision ... " (R. p. 
60-61, ,16). 
The CCRs set forth that the residential lots are owned and maintained by the 
individual owners, and the common areas are owned and maintained by SMPOA. These 
"common areas" include: "All real property, fixtures, personal property and 
improvements owned, leased or otherwise held now or in the future by the Association 
exclusively for the common use and enjoyment of the Owners ... " (R. p. 66). Consistent 
with its authority, SMPOA has the duty to maintain the common areas. (R. p. 68, 
iJ3.3.A). In addition to these duties, SMPOA has the duty to maintain certain parts of the 
exterior of the four plexes including the siding, structural portions, street lamps, entry 
ways, exterior stairs, railings, decks, and roofs. (Id.) In order to maintain these exterior 
portions of the four pl exes, SMPOA has an easement for access. (R. p. 69, iJ3. 6). The 
interiors of the units are exclusively controlled by the owner of the four plex. (R. p. 69, 
iJ3. 5). SMPOA is not granted any authority in regard to the interiors of the four plexes, 
nor do they have an easement to access the interiors. 
Each owner holds fee simple title to these residential lots, which are where the 
four plexes are located. (R. p. 67). The CCRs set forth that the owners "have the 
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exclusive right to paint, repair, tile, wash, paper or otherwise maintain, refinish and 
decorate the interior portions of their four plex ... " (R. p. 69, i\3. 5). The owners also 
have the duty to maintain "[t]he entire interior of the four plexes, including but not 
limited to flooring, ceilings, walls and wall coverings, appliances, plumbing and 
plumbing fixtures, electrical system and fixtures, all interior components of the heating 
and air conditioning system." (R. p. 69, i\3.3.B) (emphasis added). 
SMPOA contracted with a property manager, First Rate Property Management 
("FRPM"), to performed day-to-day administrative duties on behalf of SMPOA for the 
common areas. (R. p. 98-102; p. 141). FRPM also had separate, individual contracts 
with the four plex owners, including the owner of unit #4624 the Mathew E. Switzer, 
Trust ("Switzer"), to manage their residential lots. (R. p. 104-113; p. 141). The 
"PREMISES", as stated in the Switzer-FRPM agreement, is the property located at 1805 
E. Overland. Bldg. 46 #ll, #12, #23, and #24. 
FRPM had sole authority to lease out Mr. Switzer's unit, contract for services on 
his behalf, and contract for all ordinary repairs and replacements reasonably necessary to 
preserve and maintain his premises in an attractive condition and in good state of repair. 
(R. p. 104-113, ,i2.5, i\9.1, iJ9.4). FRPM also had power of attorney to manage repairs, 
alterations, and improvements, and to pay for such services on Mr. Switzer's behalf. (Id., 
,i19.2). FRPM was additionally granted authority to make any repairs it deemed 
necessary without authorization from the owner up to an amount of $250.00. (R., p. 108; 
FRPM-Switzer Agreement, i\9.5; R. p. 788) (emphasis added) 2 . This lawsuit is brought 
2 In return for these and other services, First Rate was paid 5% of the total monthly gross 
receipts from the owners to manage their residential lots. (Id., ,i16.1). SMPOA paid 
5 
due to the harm that occurred inside unit #4624. 
Adra Kipper leased unit #4624 in April of 2011 from FRPM, and then renewed 
her lease agreement for another year in March of 2012. (R. p. 187-199). Plaintiff 
Breanna Halowell and Adra Kipper were friends, and Ms. Halowell had stayed at Ms. 
Kipper's apartment many times in the past. 
II. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Defendants should be awarded their attorney fees and costs on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 41, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ~54, and Idaho 
Code§ 12-121. 
Attorney fees and costs on appeal are appropriate under I.C. § 12-121, I.R.C.P. 
54( e )(! ), and I.AR. 41, only if this Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal 
was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation. Stanley v. 
McDaniel, 134 Idaho 630, 633 (2000). Where an appeal turns on questions of law, an 
award of attorney fees under this section is proper if the law is well settled and the 
appellant has made no substantial showing that the district court misapplied the law. Id.; 
see also Stiles v. Amundson, 2016 WL 3679909, at *4 (2016) (Arguments must be well-
reasoned and have at least some precedential support.) Plaintiffs have not pointed to any 
misapplication of the law by the district court. Further, Plaintiffs are asking the Court to 
change well-established law and create an exception to established premises liability law 
to hold a property owners' association liable for property that it has no authority to 
control. 
FRPM $150.00 per month to manage the common areas of the complex. (R., p. JOO, 
iJ6 0). 
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Plaintiffs have also brought this appeal frivolously, umeasonably, and without 
foundation because they have raised new issues that are not proper for appeal. Turner v. 
Cold Springs Canyon Ltd. P 'ship, 143 Idaho 227, 230 (2006). The issue of premises 
liability was not addressed by the District Court in its Order Re: Motions for 
Reconsideration of Sagecrest POA and Switzer Summary Judgment Decisions. Further, 
at the District Court, Plaintiffs argued that the tenant, Adra Kipper, relied on SMPOA's 
assumed duties created by voluntary acts. Plaintiffs now have taken the position that 
SMPOA assumed duties for which FRPM relied upon. This is a different argument not 
addressed by the District Court. 
III. ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review 
When the Idaho Supreme Court reviews a grant of summary judgment, it does so 
under the same standard employed by the District Court. Boise Tower Assocs., LLC v. 
Hogland, 147 Idaho 774,779,215 P.3d 494,499 (2009). Summary judgment is proper "if 
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quoting Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 
When a motion for summary judgment has been properly supported with evidence 
indicating the absence of material fact issues, the opposing party's case must not rest on 
mere speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue 
of fact. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,769,820 P.2d 360,364 (1991); G&M Farms v. 
Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991). The question is 
whether a genuine issue of fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to 
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judgment as a matter of law. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 
1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). 
INTRODUCTION 
In this appeal, Plaintiffs allege that SMPOA and Mr. Kalsbeek owed premises 
liability duties, assumed duties based on voluntary undertakings, and are vicariously 
liable for FRPM's acts and omissions. Plaintiffs are also alleging that Mr. Kalsbeek is 
liable for his own acts and omissions. (Apps. 'Brief, p. 14). 
Despite amending their Complaint four times, Plaintiffs did not allege Defendants 
owed them a premises liability duty or assumed a duty from voluntary undertakings. 
Regardless, these new claims fail due to well-known Idaho legal principles: 
(I) Defendants cannot be held liable under premises liability law because, as the 
property owner's association, they did not control the residential lot and the interior of its 
units. See McDevitt v. Sportsman's Warehouse, Inc., 151 Idaho 280,285 (2011) (The 
general rule of premises liability is that one having control of the premises may be liable 
for failure to keep the premises in repair) (citing Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 
Idaho 711, 714-15 (Ct.App.2000); 
(2) Defendants cannot be liable for an assumption of a duty because they did not 
direct any maintenance or perform any maintenance on the interior of residential unit 
#4624 and neither the owner nor the tenant relied on SMPOA for any maintenance. See 
Beers v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 155 Idaho 
680, 688 (2013) (Liability for an assumed duty can only come into being to the extent 
that there is in fact an undertaking ... When a party assumes a duty by voluntarily 
performing an act that the party had no duty to perform, the duty that arises is limited to 
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the duty actually assumed); see also Gagnon v. W Bldg. Maint., Inc., 155 Idaho 112, 115 
(2013) (Reliance on the duty is a required element of a claim by third parties.); 
(3) Defendants cannot be vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of FRPM 
because FRPM was not SMPOA's agent as to the interior of unit #4624; FRPM was 
Switzer's agent for his residential lots and the interior of unit #4624. See Adams v. 
Krueger, 124 Idaho 74, 76 (1993) (The historical and economic genesis of the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, or vicarious liability, lies in the fact that the tort is brought about in 
the course of an undertaking for the benefit of the master, and that the master possesses 
the right to control the servant's course of conduct as well as the result to be 
accomplished through such conduct.). 
A. Rebuttal of Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts 
SMPOA's CCR's and the contractual agreements between FRPM and SMPOA, 
and FRPM and Switzer, unmistakably set forth that Switzer owned the unit and delegated 
authority to control the interior of the unit to FRPM. No other party had any authority 
with regard to the interior of the unit. 
Plaintiffs claim that SMPOA and Mr. Kalsbeek exercised actual control over unit 
interiors, mainly in reliance on the testimony of FRPM employees and the owner, Tony 
Drost. (Apps. ' Brief, p. 3). Mr. Drost's testimony was in direct contrast to FRPM's 
agreement with Switzer and was a veiled attempt to conceal its own failing in regard to 
its duties at the complex leading up to the November 10, 2012 incident. (See R. p. 984, 
Memo Re: Order on Motions to Reconsider) (Judge Copsey stated, "In an attempt to 
avoid its responsibilities, First Rate tries to argue that Sagecrest POA modified i\3.4 ... ") 
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In the event that FRPM employees were under the erroneous belief that SMPOA 
had the ability to control the interiors of the units, their misunderstanding and alleged 
reliance on SMPOA is a failure to perform their duties as an agent of the owners. 
FRPM's failure caunot create a duty for SMPOA to the owners and tenants at the 
complex. 
An email conversation between Tony Drost and Jon Kalsbeek, in August of 2011, 
illuminated the fact that FRPM was in control of the interiors of the units as an agent for 
the owners. (R., p. 786). In this conversation Tony Drost and Jon Kalsbeek discussed the 
water heater situation at Sagecrest. Mr. Kalsbeek stated, "the water heaters are interior 
items of each unit and is therefore an owners' choice on how to handle this situation, not 
the POA. This makes the cost for inspections and evaluations as owner may request, 
owner responsibility." (R., p. 786). Mr. Drost replied, "Everyone understands that. As 
you have requested, FRPM is keeping the POA informed of any major issues happening 
within the complex." (Id.) 
Consistently, when water heaters tested high for carbon monoxide, FRPM 
contacted the owner of the unit, not SMPOA. (R., p. 691-94, e.g. July 29, 2011 email 
from Sheila Thomason to various owners "Please let me know which building you own 
and ifl have approval to replace your water heater(s) listed."). 
Plaintiffs also claim that SMPOA and Mr. Kalsbeek had financial leverage over 
FRPM because they hired and could fire them. (App. 's Brief, p. 4-5). This argument is 
completely irrelevant to the issues of control of the interiors of the units. Switzer had a 
contract with FRPM to manage his unit #4624. Switzer granted authority to FRPM over 
his residential lot and, as a non-party to the contract, the SMPOA Board could not alter 
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this agreement in any way. 
The only manner in which FRPM could lose its contracts with the owners was for 
a meeting to be called with all of the owners at the complex (a SMPOA meeting) and 
75% of the owners would have to vote to remove and replace the property management 
company. (R., p. 96, if 6. 6A). Therefore, if the individual owners were content with 
FRPM's performance managing their residential lots, FRPM would remain the property 
owner's agent. 
Plaintiffs further claim that '\[3.8 of the CCRs grants SMPOA power to override an 
owner's rights to their residential lots to repair, maintain, and restore unit interiors, 
including through its agent, FRPM. (Apps. ' Brief,' p. 6). The only situation where 
SMPOA has the ability to force performance of maintenance on an owner's residential 
lot is when "the Owner ... shall fail to maintain any portion of such Owner's Residential 
Lot that Owner is responsible to maintain, in a manner reasonable(sic) satisfactory to the 
Board." (R. p. 70., '\[3.8) (emphasis origina[). In order for SMPOA Board to take action, 
after the owner fails to do so, it must vote on contemplated action and then give the 
Owner notice and a hearing before the Board. (Id.) (emphasis added). This is in regard 
to the exterior of the units. See Order Re: Motions to Reconsider (R., p. 980). If an 
owner allowed the exterior of the units on his residential lot to deteriorate, the dilapidated 
exterior could materially affect the other owners' property on the complex. In such an 
instance, the CCRs granted the SMPOA Board authority to vote and provide a hearing to 
deal with that potential property value issue. Nothing in i! 3.8 grants SMPOA authority to 
inspect or maintain the interior of the units. 
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,r3. 8 of the CC Rs has never been utilized by the Board in any unit, including 
#4624, and is not at issue in this claim. This provision does not override Switzer's 
ownership in fee simple of his residential lots as stated in ,r3.5. A necessary prerequisite 
to enforcement of this provision is that the owner must fail to maintain a portion of his 
residential lot and have a hearing in front of SMPOA Board members. See R. p. 70, i[3. 8. 
Neither of those instances occurred. 
Plaintiffs claim that SMPOA and Mr. Kalsbeek were long aware of the potential 
carbon monoxide threat at the complex. (Apps. 'Brief, p. 7-8). This claim is irrelevant to 
SMPOA's alleged duty to guests at the complex inside the units. It was FRPM's duty to 
maintain the interiors of the units. For example, on March 9, 2012, Mr. Kalsbeek was 
informed by Ms. Gaertner of FRPM that his unit, #3724, tested high in her scheduled 
testing of the units for carbon monoxide. (R., p. 531, p. 235, p. 337). Mr. Kalsbeek was 
a member of the entity that owned this unit. (R. p. 531). The fact that Mr. Kalsbeek was 
aware of the potential carbon monoxide issues at the complex, or of a high reading in his 
own unit, does not create a duty on the part of SMPOA to guests at the complex for 
issues in the interiors of the apartments. 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that FRPM was working with the owners, 
including Switzer, in an attempt to fix the water heater issues at the complex. SMPOA's 
Board was involved with the issues at the complex that potentially affected many of its 
members to the extent that it acted as a sounding board for FRPM. (R., p. 336, Kalsbeek 
Depa, pp. 43, ll. 2-20). In this role, SMPOA had investigated issues at their own expense 
in an attempt to help the property management company with those issues. 
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In August of 2011, SMPOA member, Bill Raff, sent an email to Mr. Kalsbeek 
requesting that SMPOA pool its resources to hire an expert to look at the carbon 
monoxide situation at the complex. (R., p. 324). This email begins with Mr. Raff 
acknowledging that the water heater in the units are the owners' responsibility and 
suggesting that the SMPOA pool their resources as a group and try to find a solution to 
the issues involving the water heaters so that each individual owner did not have to 
attempt to find a solution on their own. (Id.). The Board agreed, responding that it 
would be beneficial to all owners to pool resources. (R., p. 323). Mr. Kalsbeek discussed 
that several issues at Sagecrest had been resolved in such a manner including: PRV's 
(pressure relief valves for water heaters), expansion tanks, filters, sewers, pool, and 
landscape. Some of these issues were common area issues, while some involved interior 
items. (Id.) Mr. Kalbeek indicated that the Board had been advised of the issues and was 
reviewing options. (Id.) He further indicated that SMPOA was researching several ideas 
with First Rate and that Sheila Thomason (First Rate employee) was keeping people 
informed and enacting the solutions. (Id.) (emphasis added). 
In September of 2011, SMPOA hired Engineering Consultants, Inc. ("ECI") to 
investigate and evaluate the concerns. (R., p. 531, ,i 3; p. 742-743). ECI reported its 
findings and recommendations to FRPM site manager, Tara Gaertner. (Id., p. 742). Ms. 
Gaertner then sent the recommended repairs from the report to all of the owners of the 
residential lots with instructions to let her know if they wanted to make any of the repairs 
to their units. (R., p. 489-90). 
Mr. Switzer immediately replied to the email and asked Ms. Gaertner for 
recommendations regarding his units. (R., p. 488). Ms. Gaertner responded to Mr. 
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Switzer, informing him that all of his water heaters checked in good during the "CO 
detecting," indicating that he did not need to worry about the potential carbon monoxide 
issue in his units. (R., p. 488). FRPM hired and directed all of the contractors that 
performed maintenance. The SMPOA Board did not hire or direct any contractor to 
perform maintenance on any unit at the complex. 
Plaintiffs set forth additional issues where they claim SMPOA controlled the 
interiors of the units, relying on FRPM employee statements that Mr. Kalsbeek directed 
them in regard to interior aspects at the complex. (Apps. ' Brief,' pp. 8-13). The true 
nature of the relationship, however, is revealed in the email chain previously set forth 
involving Tony Drost and Jon Kalsbeek in August of 2011 wherein Mr. Drost 
acknowledged that the water heaters are the owners' responsibility (R., p. 786) (emphasis 
added). 
Additionally, Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Kalsbeek instructed Ms. Gaertner not to 
send information regarding the deadly CO threat to owners or tenants." (Apps.' Brief, p. 
12). This allegation is irrelevant and completely misconstrues the events. As stated 
previously, on March 9, 2012, Ms. Gaertner informed Mr. Kalsbeek that the water heater 
in his unit #3724 tested high for levels of carbon monoxide. (R., p. 447, p.531). While 
discussing the issue, Ms. Gaertner informed Mr. Kalsbeek what she believed to be the 
dangerous level of carbon monoxide in a flue of the water heater vent. Mr. Kalsbeek 
believed that she misunderstood the exposure levels of carbon monoxide in a flue versus 
carbon monoxide levels from a reading of the carbon monoxide level in a room. He 
asked her not to send this information to other owners because it was inaccurate. (R., p. 
448). She refused. (R. p. 447). She then redirected the conversation to Mr. Kalsbeek's 
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own water heater and its issues. (Id.) 
B. SMPOA did not owe Premises Liability Duties to Third-Party Guests of a 
Tenant. 
Plaintiffs claim that there is a question of fact regarding whether SMPOA 
controlled certain aspects of the interiors of the units located on the residential lots at the 
Sagecrest complex which created a premises liability duty. (Apps. ' Brief p. 14-17). 
Plaintiffs allege that Kalsbeek/SMPOA owed premises liability duties to the tenants and 
guests because Kalsbeek: (1) controlled installation of carbon monoxide detectors in the 
units; (2) controlled maintenance in the units; and, (3) controlled warnings to owners and 
tenants. Appellants make these premises liability allegations now, despite previously 
conceding that the SMPOA did not owe a premises liability-based duty to Plaintiffs to 
replace the water heater in unit 4624 because it lacks the power or authority to actually 
purchase or replace a water heater without an owner's consent. (R. p. 802 FN. 1, 81 O; 
P's Supp brief Re: POA Motion for Summary Judgment). 
SMPOA cannot have a partial premises liability duty for certain maintenance 
issues on a property. The general rule of premises liability is that one having control of 
the premises may be liable for failure to keep the premises in repair. Heath v. Honker's 
Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 713, 8 P.3d 1254, 1256 (2000). If a party lacks control 
over a premises, that party is not liable for injuries sustained thereon. See Johnson v. K-
Mart Corp., 126 Idaho 316,317,882 P.2d 971,972 (A tenant generally will not be held 
legally responsible for conditions existing outside the area over which it has possession 
or control.). 
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i. Plaintiffs have not set forth a proper premises liability claim 
against Defendants. 
The issue of premises liability was not addressed by the District Court in its Order 
Re: Motions for Reconsideration of Sagecrest POA and Switzer Summary Judgment 
Decisions, likely due to Plaintiffs' concession that the SMPOA does not have a premises 
liability duty in regard to the water heater, and this issue is not properly before this Court. 
(R., pp. 952-994). This Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. 
Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co., 152 Idaho 562, 566 (2012). See also Combs v. Kelly 
Logging, 115 Idaho 695, 698 (1989) (It is well established that arguments raised for the 
first time on appeal will not be heard); Montalbano v. Saint Alphonsus Reg 'l Med. Ctr., 
151 !daho 837,843,264 P.3d 944,950 (2011) (It is well established that in order for an 
issue to be raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms the 
basis for an assignment of error.) In the event the Court allows this claim to be heard, 
SMPOA maintains that it did not have a premises liability duty to Plaintiffs. 
Appellant's allegations that the SMPOA controlled (a) hard wire CO detector 
installation; (b) professional preventative maintenance; and ( c) warning to owners and 
tenants are not proper premises liability claims because none of them are "dangerous 
conditions or activities on the property." The dangerous condition on the property was 
the water heater that eventually emitted a dangerous amount of carbon monoxide into the 
unit. 
ii. Neither SMPOA's creating documents nor its contract with 
FRPM grant or allow any authority over the interiors of the 
units on the residential lots. 
In a premises liability analysis, control of the property is a necessary prerequisite. 
Heath, 134 Idaho at 713. Plaintiffs' only argument on this issue is that ,i3.8 of the CCRs 
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gave the SMPOA absolute discretion to deem an owner's maintenance of his or her 
property unsatisfactory and enter the property to repair, maintain, or restore it. (Apps. ' 
Brief p, 16). However, Plaintiffs previously conceded that SMPOA did not have a 
premises liability duty to replace the water heater in unit #4624 because it lacks the 
power or authority to actually purchase or replace a water heater without an owner's 
consent. (R. p. 802 FN 1, 810; P's Supp brief Re: POA Motion for Summary Judgment). 
Under a premises liability theory, SMPOA can only have a duty to Plaintiffs if 
they own3 or occupy the property. SMPOA neither owned nor occupied the residential 
Jots at the complex. Property owners associations are created to manage the common 
areas for the owners of the units on a complex. The owners, or an agent on their behalf, 
manage the units and the tenants occupy the units. 
In McDevitt v. Sportsman's Warehouse, Inc., 151 Idaho 280 (2011) a lawsuit was 
brought by a pedestrian of a multi-tenant shopping mall against one of the tenants of the 
shopping mall after tripping and falling on a recessed irrigation box on sidewalk in front 
of tenant's retail store. Apparently the tenant had occasionally used the common area for 
a hot dog stand and displays. At issue was whether the tenant had a duty to make safe 
common areas which were not a part of its leased premises. 151 Idaho at 285. 
In that case, this Court looked to the CCRs and lease of the tenant and landlord to 
find that the tenant could not, as a matter of law, control the premises because the 
governing documents did not give the tenant any authority to control the common area 
where the plaintiff was injured. 151 Idaho at 286. 
3 An agent for the owner, such as FRPM, could also potentially be liable to the 
Appellants. 
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Similarly, in our circumstance, the "common areas" are the only areas SMPOA is 
able to control at the complex. (R. pp. 66, 68, ~3.3.A). SMPOA has a duty to maintain 
the common areas, and also certain parts of the exterior of the four plexes, for which it 
has an easement to access the exterior of each four plex. (R. p. 69, ~3. 6). The SMPOA 
has no authority over the interiors of the four plexes which are exclusively controlled by 
the owner of the four-plex. (R. pp. 67, 69, ~3.3.B, ~3.5). 
~3.8 of the CCRs is a provision intended to protect the value of the properties in 
the event an owner allows his property to fall into disrepair. if 3.8 states: 
In the event the Owner of any Residential Lot improved 
with a Four Plex shall fail to maintain any portion of such 
Owner's Residential Lot that Owner is responsible to 
maintain, in a manner reasonable satisfactory to the Board, 
after approval by vote of at least sixty percent ( 60%) of the 
members of the Board present and voting and subject to 
such Owner's right to notice and a hearing before the 
Board, the Association may, through its agents and 
employees, enter upon the Residential Lot or Four Plex and 
repair, maintain and restore the Residential Lot, or the Four 
Plex. The cost of such repair, maintenance and restoration 
shall be chargeable to the Owner of such Residential Lot or 
Four Plex and shall constitute a lien on the Residential Lot 
of such Owner, collectible in the same manner as Limited 
Assessments under this Declaration. 
(R., p. 70) (emphasis origina[). 
FRPM's General Manager, Liz Loop, agreed that the only circumstance SMPOA 
could take any action regarding a residential lot under this provision was if an owner had 
failed to maintain his or her unit, and only after taking the steps outlined in the provision. 
(R., p. 116, Loop Depa., p. 77, ll. 1-17). This provision does not override an owner's 
exclusive rights, set forth in ~3.5 of the CCRs, in regard to the units on his residential lot. 
Regardless, this provision has never been utilized by the SMPOA Board. (See R., p. 69, 
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~3. 5). The undisputed evidence proves that FRPM and Switzer were actively maintaining 
his residential lot. (R., pp. 488-90). 
SMPOA's agreement with FRPM was consistent and limited FRPM's 
corresponding duties to perform day-to-day administrative duties on behalf of the 
SMPOA for the common areas. (R. p. 98-102; p. 141). 
iii. FRPM controlled the interiors of the units on behalf of the 
owners and had a duty to warn the tenants of any dangerous 
condition or activity. 
SMPOA had no control of Switzer's residential lots and did not have a duty to its 
tenants for interior issues. Premises liability duties to guests of a tenant are narrow and a 
landowner is only required to share with the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions 
or activities on the land. See Stiles, 2016 WL 3679909 at *2. 
In Stiles, a tenant's guest filed a complaint against the landlord after he fell in the 
backyard and lacerated his arm on a shard of glass protruding from a bay window that 
was leaning on fence in backyard. This Court stated that a premises liability duty to a 
guest of the tenant is held by an "owner" or "possessor" of the property. 2016 WL 
3679909 at *2. Tenants are held responsible as if they were the owner with respect to 
third parties .... and a landlord generally is not responsible for injuries to third persons in 
privity with the tenant which are caused by failure to keep or put the demised premises in 
good repair. Id. (citing Robinson v. Mueller, 156 Idaho 237, 241, 322 P.3d 319, 323 
(Ct.App.2014). This Court noted that the only exception to this rule is when the landlord 
created the hazard him or herself when he voluntarily undertakes repairs. Id. at *4. 
In this case, SMPOA were neither making the repairs nor occupying the property. 
All of the maintenance work on the interiors of the units was contracted by FRPM and 
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approved and paid for by the owners of the units. The owner of #4624, Switzer, testified 
that maintenance was taken care ofby FRPM and approved by himself: 
Q. What was your expectation with First Rate as to what 
they would contact you about in terms of maintenance? 
A. They would - they were my agent. They would contact 
me regarding any kind of maintenance, upkeep, service, 
preventative maintenance, problems, wear and tear, carpet, 
whatever the issue may be. They would be the one - they 
would contact me and ask me how I wanted to handle it, 
whether - and would advise me if it was something that 
could be repaired or replaced. 
(R., p. 203). Further, FRPM site manager, Tara Gaertner, understood that maintenance 
and the installation of carbon monoxide detectors in the units was a FRPM responsibility. 
On October 25, 2012, Ms. Gaertner, Mr. Drost, Liz Loop, and Mr. Kalsbeek had a 
discussion regarding the installation of detectors after the Meridian City Fire Department 
was called to the complex for carbon monoxide being present in a unit. Ms. Gaertner 
stated that she wanted carbon monoxide detectors installed in all of the units: 
Ms. [Gaertner]: I mean, I understand that it's the owners' 
decision 'cause it's the owners' money we're spending. 
But. .. I'm the manager and it's my responsibility ... 
(R., p. 414) (emphasis added). 
Not only did FRPM have a duty to perform general maintenance, but they were 
obligated to have "preventative maintenance" performed on #4624 bi-annually at the 
expense of the owner: 
Agent shall contract for bi-annual Preventative 
Maintenance at the expense of the Owner. This contractor 
will check all plumbing and plumbing fixtures, caulking, 
door stops, dryer vents, smoke detectors, and furnace filters 
and make necessary repairs. 
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(R., p. 180). In a discussion with Mr. Kalsbeek regarding such preventative maintenance 
and carbon monoxide installation, Ms. Gaertner attempted to explain that such 
maintenance had not been done because some owners did not approved the expense. (R., 
p. 414). Mr. Kalsbeek owned units at the complex and was familiar with the contracts 
between FRPM and the individual owners which allow FRPM to perform maintenance on 
the unit up to $250.00 a month without owner's authorization. (R., p. 108; FRPM-
Switzer Agreement, ~9. 5). Mr. Kalsbeek asked her why she thought owners would have 
to approve such a minimal expense, to which Ms. Gaertner did not have a response. (R., 
pp. 414-415). Despite her protestations, Ms. Gaertner admitted that she was familiar with 
this provision in FRPM's agreement with the owners. (R. p. 788, Gaertner Depa, p. 309, 
ll. 12-17). 
Further, Mr. Kalsbeek asked her why there had been carbon monoxide detectors 
installed in only 64 of the 194 units over the course of eight months, to which Ms. 
Gaertner replied that they had failed to perform preventative maintenance and carbon 
monoxide detector installation because they were too busy. (R., p. 414-15) ("Cause we've 
been swamped.") 
FRPM was the entity that had the duty to share information with the owner, the 
tenant, and any guests, via the tenant. The tenant in #4624, Adra Kipper, communicated 
only with FRPM at the complex regarding maintenance issues in her apartment. (R. pp. 
892-893; Kipper Depa). FRPM drafted and delivered notice to Ms. Kipper that her water 
heater had a potential issue and that they were dealing with it. (R. p. 239, p. 242, pp. 939-
940; see also R., p. 146; Affidavit of Tony Drost). At the same time, FRPM provided Ms. 
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Kipper with a carbon monoxide detector. (Id., p. 242). 4 
In contrast, Ms. Kipper was not aware there was a property owners' association at 
the complex. She had never spoken to Mr. Kalsbeek or any other member of SMPOA 
Board. (R., p. 897). SMPOA did not have, nor assume, a duty to warn tenants regarding 
any issues at the complex. SMPOA served as a sounding board for the property manager 
when issues arose at the complex that concerned multiple owners. (R., p. 336, Kalsbeek 
Depa, pp. 43, ll. 2-20; R., p. 323-24). Plaintiffs are asking the Court to disregard 
established premises liability law and create an exception that allows the creation of a 
duty for non-owners or occupiers through allegations of voluntary undertakings. 
In the event the Court were to impose such an exception it would have a chilling 
effect on all property owners' associations attempting to help their property management 
company identify solutions to problems at its own complex. 
C. Neither Mr. Kalsbeek, nor SMPOA assumed a duty to third-party guests 
of a tenant. 
i. This claim is not properly in front of the Court. 
This claim is not properly before to this Court because Plaintiffs are raising a new 
issue. Plaintiffs have changed their argument regarding their allegations of SMPOA's 
assumed duties in this case. This Court will not consider issues raised for the first time 
on appeal. Enriquez, 152 Idaho at 566 (2012); see also Montalbano, 151 Idaho at 843, 
264 P.3d at 950 (It is well established that in order for an issue to be raised on appeal, the 
record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an assignment of error.) 
4 There was not a working carbon monoxide detector in #4624 at the time of the incident 
because Ms. Kipper testified that the carbon monoxide detector started beeping due the 
batteries being low. Rather than replace the batteries, she took the batteries out and put 
the detector in the closet. (Aug. p. 55-56). In her lease agreement, Ms. Kipper was 
required to replace the batteries. (R., p. 192-93, ~39.1, ~39.2, ~42). 
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At the District Court, Plaintiffs argued that the tenant, Adra Kipper, relied on 
SMPOA's assumed duties. Plaintiffs now have taken the position that SMPOA assumed 
duties and FRPM relied on SMPOA. 
Plaintiffs are now also claiming SMPOA assumed different duties than they 
argued had been assumed by SMPOA at district court. In Plaintiff's Supp. Brief Re: POA 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs argued that SMPOA assumed a duty to replace 
the water heater by inducing reliance by the tenant, Adra Kipper. (R., p. 813). Plaintiffs 
also argued that SMPOA voluntarily assumed a duty and affirmatively increased the 
danger by implementing a false and dangerous protocol and actively stymied the response 
efforts by others. (R., p. 816). Plaintiffs stated that SMPOA would not allow FRPM to 
hire a professional plumber to maintain/clean the filters in the water heaters and also 
rejected FRPM's idea to have a handy-man contractor go door-to-door to ensure that each 
apartment unit had a functioning CO detector. (Id.); see also Plaintiffs' Supp. Brief Re: 
POA Motion for Summary Judgment ("SMPOA expressly represented to Adra Kipper 
that it would replace the water heater, and she relied on the PO A's undertaking ... The 
SMPOA induced Kipper's reliance by voluntarily assuming a duty to replace the water 
heater in 4624.") (R., p. 813). 
On appeal, Plaintiffs are now argumg that FRPM relied on Mr. Kalsbeek's 
decision-making for installing hard-wired CO detectors, professional preventative 
maintenance, and issuing warnings to owners regarding the CO issue at the complex. 
(Apps. ' Brief, p. 21). In the event the Court allows this claim to be heard, SMPOA 
maintains that it did not assume a duty to Plaintiffs. 
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ii. SMPOA did not assume any duties to Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs allege that SMPOA assumed a duty to tenants' guests by voluntarily 
undertaking decisions regarding maintenance of the interiors of the units located on the 
residential lots. (Apps.' Brief, p. 18-22). This claim fails for two reasons: (I) As 
previously stated, SMPOA did not, and cannot, assume a duty to maintain property that it 
has no authority to control; and, (2) Neither the Plaintiffs, the owner of the unit or its 
agent FRPM, nor the tenant Ms. Kipper relied on SMPOA for any of these alleged 
assumed duties. 
Plaintiffs argue that FRPM relied on Mr. Kalsbeek and SMPOA to make 
decisions regarding maintenance on the interior of the units. (Apps.' Brief, p. 19). To 
support this argument, Plaintiffs claim that this reliance was induced by Mr. Kalsbeek 
asserting control over FRPM because the SMPOA had the power to hire and fire the 
property management company and used this power to micromanage FRPM. (Apps. ' 
Brief, p. 20). Plaintiffs further argue that Mr. Kalsbeek never informed FRPM that he 
lacked the power to make decisions regarding the interiors of the units. (Id., p. 21). 5 
Plaintiffs set forth this argument with knowledge that the property management 
company, FRPM, was contractually obligated to perform the maintenance, was being 
paid to perform the maintenance, and was relied upon by the owner of the unit, Mr. 
Switzer, and the tenants to perform the maintenance. The undisputed facts demonstrate 
that FRPM neglected to perform the maintenance and take care of issues in the units on 
behalf of the owners. After the lawsuit was initiated, FRPM blamed Mr. Kalsbeek for not 
5 Assumption of a duty requires that an act be performed. Mr. Kalsbeek "not informing" 
FRPM that he lacked the power to make decisions regarding the interiors of the units is 
not an assumption of a duty. 
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"allowing" it to properly do its job. This lack of accountability was not lost on Judge 
Copsey. (See R., p. 984, Order Re: Motions to Reconsider) (Discussing FRPM's claim 
that the SMPOA modified its contract with FRPM, Judge Copsey states, "In an attempt to 
avoid its responsibilities, First Rate tries to argue that Sagecrest POA modified i!3.4"). 
Even when an affirmative duty generally is not present, a legal duty may arise if 
one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior duty to do so. Baccus v. 
AmeriPride Servs., Inc., 145 Idaho 346, 350 (2008). A duty arises in the negligence 
context when: (1) One previously has undertaken to perform a primarily safety-related 
service; (2) others are relying on the continued performance of the service; and (3) it is 
reasonably foreseeable that legally-recognized harm could result from failure to perform 
the undertaking. Beers v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 155 Idaho 680, 688 (2013). When a party assumes a duty by voluntarily 
performing an act that the party had no duty to perform, the duty that arises is limited to 
the duty actually assumed. Id. 
The underlying policy here arises from a person voluntarily assuming a position, 
and by filling that position another can reasonably rely on that person to act with 
reasonable care and provide protection from unreasonable risks of harm. Id. (citing 
Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 248 (1999). Reliance on the duty is a required 
element of a claim by third parties. Gagnon v. W. Bldg. Maint., Inc., 155 Idaho 112, I I 5 
(2013). 
Plaintiffs cite Baccus, supra, for their argument that SMPOA and/or Mr. Kalsbeek 
can be liable to a third party guest at the complex because the property management 
company, FRPM, relied on SMPOA to make decisions regarding the interiors of the 
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complex. (Apps. 'Brief, p. 19). 
In Baccus, the defendant had contracted to place non-slip safety mats at the 
entrance of a building. The defendant failed to place the safety mats on one occasion and 
Baccus slipped, fell and was injured. This Court found that by undertaking to place the 
safety mats which induced reliance by those in the building where the accident occurred, 
the defendant had assumed a duty by undertaking to perform an action. Id., 145 Idaho at 
352. 
The Court stated the fact of the matter is that Ameripride was under a legal duty 
to prevent foreseeable harm once it promised to place mats at the southern entry. Id. 
Consequentially, by contracting to place mats at the entrance, Ameripride assumed a 
legal duty of care to third persons. Id. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on this case is entirely misplaced as the Court stated that 
Ameripride had been hired by the worker's employer to provide safety mats, and had 
done so on prior occasions. 145 Idaho at 351-352. Thus, the defendants actually assumed 
a duty to the employees by placing mats in the entry. They could potentially be liable for 
the failure to continue to place mats in the entry because the employees were relying on 
the safety mats to be there, despite the fact that the employees did not know who was 
placing the mats. Id. This case is illustrative of what is missing in the Plaintiffs' 
allegations against the SMPOA; they are claiming that the SMPOA assumed a duty for 
acts that it never undertook. 
Gagnon, supra, is also instructive on this issue. In Gagnon, an employee of a 
bank was injured after slipping on ice in the parking lot and brought a claim against his 
employer's snow removal contractor, alleging that it negligently maintained the parking 
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lot. Defendant was granted summary judgment based on the fact that it did not undertake 
an absolute duty to remove snow and distribute ice melt in the Wells Fargo Bank parking 
lot based on its contract. Id., 155 Idaho at 114. 
The employee appealed and this Court affirmed the district court's holding, 
stating, "it is undisputed that Western did not spread ice melt on the Hayden branch 
parking lot during the winter of 2007-2008 and therefore it is inconceivable that Gagnon 
could have relied upon it to do so." 155 Idaho at 115. 
In our case, FRPM had contracted to maintain the interiors of the units and were 
maintaining the units. Therefore, they assumed a legal duty to tenants and their guests. 
All parties involved knew that FRPM had this duty: Mr. Switzer, 6 Mr. Drost, 7 Ms. 
Gaertner, 8 and Mr. Kalsbeek all stated that the issues surrounding the water heaters were 
owner issues and FRPM' s responsibility to maintain as the agent. SMPOA, on the other 
hand, could not assume a duty that FRPM was legally obligated to perform on behalf of 
the owners. Consistently, FRPM could not rely on SMPOA for the duties it was 
contractually obligated to perform. 
6 
"[FRPM was] my agent. They would contact me regarding any kind of maintenance, 
upkeep, service, preventative maintenance, problems, wear and tear, carpet, whatever the 
issue may be. They would be the one - they would contact me and ask me how I wanted 
to handle it, whether - and would advise me if it was something that could be repaired or 
replaced." (R., p. 203). 
7 Mr. Kalsbeek stated, "the water heaters are interior items of each unit and is therefore 
an owners' choice on how to handle this situation, not the POA. This makes the cost for 
inspections and evaluations as owner may request, owner responsibility." Mr. Drost 
replied, "Everyone understands that. As you have requested, FRPM is keeping the POA 
informed of any major issues happening within the complex." (R., p. 786). 
s "I mean, I understand that it's the owners' decision 'cause it's the owners' money we're 
spending. But. . .I'm the manager and it's my responsibility." (R., p. 414). 
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Plaintiffs claim that SMPOA assumed a duty to install the detectors due to the fact 
that FRPM "asked Mr. Kalsbeek for permission to immediately install hard-wired CO 
detectors in all units[ and] Mr. Kalsbeek never said that he lacked the power to make this 
decision." (Apps. ' Brief, p. 21) ( emphasis added). Mr. Kalsbeek' s alleged non-response 
is not an affirmative act creating an assumption of a duty to install detectors. In fact, 
FRPM had been having detectors installed over the course of eight months but failed to 
have them installed in every unit. (R., p. 414-15) (Ms. Gaertner stated FRPM was 
"swamped" and too busy to set up the installation. She also claimed that some owners 
didn't approve the cost.). The SMPOA did not install, or contract to have installed, a 
single carbon monoxide detector at the Sagecrest complex. 
Plaintiffs also claim that the SMPOA assumed a duty over the preventative 
maintenance of the interiors of the units. (Apps. ' Brief, p. 21). Plaintiffs argue that when 
asked by an FRPM employee regarding the maintenance, "Mr. Kalsbeek never said that 
he lacked the power to make this decision." (Id.) Again, Mr. Kalsbeek's alleged non-
response is not an affirmative act creating an assumption of duty to install detectors. 
Indeed, it was FRPM who was contractually obligated to have preventative maintenance 
performed on #4624 bi-annually at the expense of the owner: 
Agent shall contract for bi-annual Preventative 
Maintenance at the expense of the Owner. This contractor 
will check all plumbing and plumbing fixtures, caulking, 
door stops, dryer vents, smoke detectors, and furnace filters 
and make necessary repairs. 
(R., p. 180). SMPOA did not perform preventative maintenance on a single unit at the 
Sagecrest complex. 
Plaintiffs also argue that SMPOA prevented FRPM from sending a letter from 
Ben Davis to the owners warning of the dangers of the water heaters to the owners of the 
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complex. (Apps.' Brief, p. 21). As stated above, this misconstrues the facts. Further, 
disagreeing with FRPM's decision to send erroneous information to the owners is not an 
affirmative act creating a duty to warn, especially where FRPM sent the information 
anyway. 
Finally, Plaintiffs generally claim that "if FRPM had not been relying on Mr. 
Kalsbeek's decision-making, it would have provided adequate warnings to owners and 
tenants." However, it was FRPM's duty to send the owners adequate warnings of the 
dangers of the potential carbon monoxide issues with the water heaters and FRPM did 
send such information to the owners. Mr. Davis's letter was received by FRPM in July of 
2011. (R., p. 647; Plaint/Ifs' Response in Opposition to Defendants Kalsbeek, Arla, 
Schwab, and Meisner 's Motion for Summary Judgment). Ms. Gaertner sent a letter to the 
owners on November 9, 2011 with information regarding repairs to prevent carbon 
monoxide in the units. (R., p. 489-90). She also sent a letter to all of the owners in 
August of 2011 and again in March of 2012 with information of the carbon monoxide 
levels and issues in the units at the complex. (R., p. 447-48). 
Most importantly, in regard to unit #4624, Ms. Gaertner sent recommended 
repairs from the ECI report to all of the owners of the residential lots on November 9, 
2011, including Switzer, with instructions to let her !mow if they wanted to make any of 
the repairs to their units or replace their water heaters. (R., p. 489-90). Mr. Switzer 
immediately replied to the email and asked Ms. Gaertner for recommendations regarding 
his units. (R., p. 488). Ms. Gaertner responded to Mr. Switzer, informing him that all of 
his water heaters checked in good during the "CO detecting," indicating that he did not 
need to worry about the potential carbon monoxide issue in his units. (R., p. 488). The 
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water heater was not replaced in unit #4624. 
SMPOA undertook no acts to warn the tenants of the dangerous condition on the 
property previously, and as a result, did not assume a duty to do so in the future. 
iii. SMPOA is not vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of 
FRPM. 
FRPM was not the agent for SMPOA for any issues related to the interior of unit 
#4624. SMPOA had no right to control and did not control the activities of FRPM in 
regard to the residential lots. Therefore, SMPOA cannot be vicariously liable for the acts 
or omissions of FRPM in regard to the interior of unit #4624; RFPM was Switzer's agent 
as to the interior of unit #4624. See Adams v. Krueger, supra. 
The CCRs provide that the owners had the exclusive right to the interiors of their 
units. (R., p 539-540; iJJ. 5). Consistently, owners have the attendant duty to maintain 
the entire interior of their units including appliances and plumbing and plumbing fixtures. 
(R., p. 540, ,i 3.3). "Exclusive right" is defined as a right "vested in one person, entity, or 
body to do something or be protected from something." RIGHT, Black's Law Dictionary 
(10th ed. 2014). 
The contracts between SMPOA and FRPM, and Switzer and FRPM, further 
illustrate that FRPM was not an agent for SMPOA with regard to the interior of unit 
#4624. The contract between FRPM and Switzer specifically allowed FRPM to make 
ordinary repairs and replacement necessary to preserve and maintain the interior of 
Switzer's unit. (R. p. 180). FRPM did not need Switzer's approval to make repairs when 
the cost was below $250.00. id. The contract between SMPOA and FRPM provides no 
authority for FRPM to act with regard to the interior of a building, consistent with the 
CCRs. (R., p. 1019-1020, iJ3.4). 
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Plaintiffs argued below that the testimony of the President of First Rate and 
course of conduct modified the agreement between FRPM and SMPOA. The trial court 
correctly held that neither could modify the agreement without placing it in writing 
pursuant to Section 10 of the contract. (R., p.985; p. 101, ~10). FRPM could not 
unilaterally modify the contract. (City of Meridian v. Petra, Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 436, 
299 P.3d 232, 243 (2013)). Plaintiffs now argue that "actual conduct" between SMPOA 
and FRPM somehow makes FRPM the agent of SMPOA. 
Whether facts sufficient to constitute an agency relationship exist is a question of 
fact for the jury, however, whether a given set of facts are sufficient to constitute an 
agency relationship is a question of law appropriate for review by the Supreme Court. 
Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 735, fn. 2 (2016). 
An agency relationship is created through the acts of the principal who either: (]) 
expressly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions on his or her behalf; (2) 
impliedly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions which are necessary to 
complete those actions that were expressly authorized; or (3) apparently grants the agent 
authority to act through conduct towards a third party indicating that express or implied 
authority has been granted. Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497, 708 P.2d 900, 902 
(1985). Apparent authority cannot be created by the acts of the agent alone. Id. Agency 
relationships are limited in scope to the express, implied, and apparent authority granted 
by the principal. Only acts by the agent that are within the scope of the agency 
relationship affect the principal's legal liability. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY§ 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). Humphries, 159 Idaho at 735. 
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The standard for apparent authority stated in section 2.03 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Agency and section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts has two essential 
elements: 1) conduct by the principal that would lead a person to reasonably believe that 
another person acts on the principal's behalf, i.e., conduct by the principal 'holding out' 
that person as its agent; and 2) acceptance of the agent's service by one who reasonably 
believes it is rendered on behalf of the principal. Navo v. Bingham Memorial Hosp., 160 
Idaho 363, 373 P.3d 681, 693 (2016) [citing, Jones v. Healths. Treasure Valley Hosp., 
147 Idaho 109 (2009). 
Plaintiffs have conceded that there is no actual or implied authority and are 
relying upon apparent authority for their argument that "actual conduct" can create an 
agency relationship. This argument is unavailing to the Plaintiffs as apparent authority 
rests upon the conduct of principal, and reliance by a third party. Ms. Kipper, the third 
party, had no knowledge of the existence of SMPOA and therefore could not have relied 
on SMPOA. (R., p. 896-897). In addition, Plaintiffs can point to no conduct on the part 
of SMPOA that would lead a person to reasonably believe that FRPM acted on its behalf. 
To the contrary, the undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that SMPOA had no 
authority over FRPM in regards to the interior of the complex units. 
For instance, in an email from Mr. Kalsbeek to Mr. Drost, Mr. Kalsbeek 
specifically stated: "Just to clarify, the water heaters are interior items of each unit and is 
therefore an owner's choice on how to handle the situation, not the POA. This makes the 
cost for inspections and evaluations an owner may request, owner responsibility." (R., p. 
786). In reply, Mr. Drost stated: "Everyone understands that. As you have requested, 
FRPM is keeping the POA informed of any major issues happening within the complex. 
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Also, their [sic] certainly will be savings for all if a common action/repairs is made, IF 
[sic] we buy 100 water heaters at one time, we should be able to get them at a reduced 
price. If we do them one at a time, cost will be more. We are just trying to communicate 
as best we can." (Id.). 
After the owner's meeting on October 31, 2011 (in which the owners were 
advised by Kalsbeek (as president) that a recommendation had been made by an engineer 
for the owners to replace the water heaters), FRPM sent out an email on November 9, 
2011 to the owners recommending repair for the replacement of existing water heaters 
and replacement of hard wired CO/smoke detectors. (R. p. 228-229). The building 
owners, including Switzer, were informed by FRPM: "again this work is highly 
recommended. Please let me know what you would like to have me done and I can get 
that scheduled as soon as possible." (Id.) The water heater in Unit #4624 was not 
replaced. (R. p. 488). 
The cases cited by Plaintiffs from other jurisdictions are unpersuasive in that they 
address issues of apparent authority which are not present in this case. However, 
Barefoot v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 424 F.2d 1001, 1005 (1970), 
provides excellent guidance on allegations based upon an agent's conduct. In that case, 
the Court held that there was "no evidence tending to establish [agent's] apparent or 
actual authority other than testimony relating to the words and conduct of [agent] 
himself." Id. The Court went on: "it is generally understood however that the ostensible 
authority must result from the words and conduct of the principal rather than the agent". 
Id. Here, the only evidence presented by Plaintiffs regarding the alleged apparent 
authority by SMPOA is the testimony of Mr. Drost. As such, Plaintiffs have failed to 
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establish that FRPM was acting as an agent of SMPOA. 
Plaintiffs' argument that the FRPM was the dual agent of Switzer Trust and 
SMPOA is also unsupported by the evidence. It is undisputed that SMPOA had authority 
to direct FRPM with regard to common areas, and equally undisputed that the Switzer 
Trust had exclusive control over the interior of the unit by the CCRs and contracts with 
FRPM. This dichotomy is demonstrated by the actual conduct of FRPM. For example, 
there were several residential units that were not managed by FRPM. FRPM had no 
contact with the owners or tenants of those units and took no action of any kind in those 
units. (R., pp. 870-77, Gaertner Depa; p. 994, Orders Re: Motions to Reconsider). If 
FRPM was acting on behalf of the SMPOA, it would have contacted and taken action for 
every unit, not just the unit owners that had a contract with FRPM. 
"[S]everal principals may be bound pursuant to the acts and representations of a 
common agent, but it must appear that authority was given by all the alleged principals, 
and an agent cannot bind one principal in the separate business of another." 2A C..T.S. 
Agency Section 245, at 953. (emphasis added.) (Cited by Restatement (Third) of Agency 
§ 316, for the proposition that multiple principals are not bound by an agent's act in the 
absence of an assent, Reporter's notes, Section B); First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. 
Acceptance Ins. Companies, Inc., 675 N.W.2d 689, 702 (Neb. App. 2004). With regard 
to the interiors of unit #4629, FRPM was acting solely as agent of Switzer. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
SMPOA respectfully requests the Court affirm the district court's decision, 
finding that it owed no duty and assumed no duties to Plaintiffs. SMPOA further 
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requests that the Court find that FRPM was not its agent as to the interior of unit #4624. 
SMPOA also requests an _awl}·d of their attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
DATED this ;)._3~ of August, 2016. 
Moore & Elia, r: 
PO Box 6756 
Boise, ID 83707 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent, 
Sagecrest Multi Family Property Owners' 
Association, Inc. 
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